Core/SSL: Secure random and nonce generator with SecureBuffer support (#270)

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İsmail Yılmaz 2026-04-25 07:52:33 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent c402c6b7a0
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6 changed files with 476 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
#include <Core/Core.h>
#include <Core/SSL/SSL.h>
using namespace Upp;
CONSOLE_APP_MAIN
{
StdLogSetup(LOG_COUT | LOG_FILE);
auto Test = [](const String& name, const Function<void()>& fn) {
String txt = "---" + name + ": ";
try {
fn();
txt << "PASSED";
}
catch(...) {
txt << "FAILED";
}
LOG(txt);
};
Test("Basic functionality", [] {
ASSERT(SecureNonce(16).GetSize() == 16);
ASSERT(SecureNonce(64).GetSize() == 64);
ASSERT(SecureNonce(12).GetSize() == 12);
ASSERT(!SecureNonce(16).IsEmpty());
ASSERT(SecureNonce(1).GetSize() == 12); // Enforce minimum
ASSERT(SecureRandom(0).GetSize() == 1); // Enforce minimum
});
Test("Standard nonce helpers, length check", [] {
ASSERT(GetAESGCMNonce().GetSize() == 12);
ASSERT(GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce().GetSize() == 12);
ASSERT(GetTLSNonce().GetSize() == 12);
ASSERT(GetAESCCMNonce().GetSize() == 13);
ASSERT(GetJWTNonce().GetSize() == 16);
ASSERT(GetOAuthNonce().GetSize() == 16);
ASSERT(GetOCSPNonce().GetSize() == 20);
ASSERT(GetECDSANonce().GetSize() == 32);
ASSERT(GetDTLSCookie().GetSize() == 32);
});
Test("SecureRandom basic checks", [] {
auto buf = SecureRandom(32);
ASSERT(buf.GetSize() == 32);
ASSERT(!buf.IsEmpty());
// Verify it's not all zeros
bool has_nonzero = false;
for(size_t i = 0; i < buf.GetSize(); i++) {
if(buf[i] != 0) {
has_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
ASSERT(has_nonzero);
});
Test("Uniqueness (single-threaded)", [] {
const int NONCE_COUNT = 1000;
Vector<String> nonces;
nonces.Reserve(NONCE_COUNT);
for(int i = 0; i < NONCE_COUNT; i++) {
auto buf = SecureNonce(12);
nonces.Add(String((const char*)~buf, buf.GetSize()));
}
Sort(nonces);
for(int i = 1; i < nonces.GetCount(); i++)
ASSERT(nonces[i] != nonces[i - 1]);
});
Test("Uniqueness (multi-threaded)", [] {
const int THREAD_COUNT = CPU_Cores();
const int NONCES_PER_THREAD = 100000;
Vector<String> all_nonces;
CoFor(THREAD_COUNT, [&all_nonces](int n) {
Vector<String> nonces;
nonces.Reserve(NONCES_PER_THREAD);
for(int i = 0; i < NONCES_PER_THREAD; i++) {
auto buf = SecureNonce(12);
nonces.Add(String((const char*)~buf, buf.GetSize()));
}
CoWork::FinLock();
all_nonces.AppendPick(pick(nonces));
});
ASSERT(all_nonces.GetCount() == THREAD_COUNT * NONCES_PER_THREAD);
Sort(all_nonces);
for(int i = 1; i < all_nonces.GetCount(); i++)
ASSERT(all_nonces[i] != all_nonces[i - 1]);
});
Test("Verify nonce internal structure (12-15 byte nonces)", [] {
auto nonce1 = SecureNonce(12);
auto nonce2 = SecureNonce(12);
// First 4 bytes (process ID) should be identical
ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce1, ~nonce2, 4) == 0);
// Next 8 bytes (counter) should differ
uint64 counter1 = Peek64(~nonce1 + 4);
uint64 counter2 = Peek64(~nonce2 + 4);
ASSERT(counter1 != counter2);
// Expect sequential or very close counters
// Allow for other threads potentially getting nonces in between
uint64 diff = (counter2 > counter1) ? (counter2 - counter1) : (counter1 - counter2);
ASSERT(diff <= 100);
});
Test("Verify nonce internal structure (16+ byte nonces)", [] {
auto nonce1 = SecureNonce(16);
auto nonce2 = SecureNonce(16);
// First 8 bytes (process ID) should be identical
ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce1, ~nonce2, 8) == 0);
// Next 8 bytes (counter) should differ
uint64 counter1 = Peek64(~nonce1 + 8);
uint64 counter2 = Peek64(~nonce2 + 8);
ASSERT(counter1 != counter2);
uint64 diff = (counter2 > counter1) ? (counter2 - counter1) : (counter1 - counter2);
ASSERT(diff <= 100);
});
Test("Verify nonce entropy (using chi-square method)", [] {
const int NONCE_SIZE = 32; // Total nonce size
const int RANDOM_OFFSET = 16; // Skip 8B PID + 8B counter
const int RANDOM_SIZE = NONCE_SIZE - RANDOM_OFFSET;
const int SAMPLE_COUNT = 1000;
const double CHI_SQUARE_THRESHOLD = 350.0; // 99% confidence
String random_bytes;
random_bytes.Reserve(SAMPLE_COUNT * RANDOM_SIZE);
// Generate samples
for(int i = 0; i < SAMPLE_COUNT; ++i) {
auto nonce = SecureNonce(NONCE_SIZE);
random_bytes.Cat((const char*)(~nonce + RANDOM_OFFSET), RANDOM_SIZE);
}
// Frequency analysis
Vector<int> freq(256, 0);
const byte* data = (const byte*)(const char*)random_bytes;
for(int i = 0; i < random_bytes.GetLength(); ++i)
freq[data[i]]++;
// Chi-square test
double expected = random_bytes.GetLength() / 256.0;
double chi2 = 0.0;
for(int count : freq) {
double delta = count - expected;
chi2 += (delta * delta) / expected;
}
ASSERT(chi2 < CHI_SQUARE_THRESHOLD);
});
Test("Verify different nonce sizes use correct layouts", [] {
// 12-byte nonce: [4B PID | 8B counter]
auto nonce12 = SecureNonce(12);
ASSERT(nonce12.GetSize() == 12);
// 14-byte nonce: [4B PID | 8B counter | 2B random]
auto nonce14 = SecureNonce(14);
ASSERT(nonce14.GetSize() == 14);
// 16-byte nonce: [8B PID | 8B counter]
auto nonce16 = SecureNonce(16);
ASSERT(nonce16.GetSize() == 16);
// 32-byte nonce: [8B PID | 8B counter | 16B random]
auto nonce32 = SecureNonce(32);
ASSERT(nonce32.GetSize() == 32);
// Verify PID portions match where expected
// For <16 byte nonces, compare first 4 bytes
ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce12, ~nonce14, 4) == 0);
// For >=16 byte nonces, compare first 8 bytes
ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce16, ~nonce32, 8) == 0);
});
Test("Concurrent nonce generation stress test", [] {
const int THREAD_COUNT = 16;
const int NONCES_PER_THREAD = 10000;
std::atomic<int> total_generated{0};
CoFor(THREAD_COUNT, [&total_generated](int n) {
for(int i = 0; i < NONCES_PER_THREAD; i++) {
auto nonce = SecureNonce(16);
ASSERT(nonce.GetSize() == 16);
ASSERT(!nonce.IsEmpty());
}
total_generated += NONCES_PER_THREAD;
});
ASSERT(total_generated == THREAD_COUNT * NONCES_PER_THREAD);
});
Test("Helper functions return correct types", [] {
// Verify all helpers return SecureBuffer<byte>
auto gcm = GetAESGCMNonce();
auto chacha = GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce();
auto tls = GetTLSNonce();
auto ccm = GetAESCCMNonce();
auto jwt = GetJWTNonce();
auto oauth = GetOAuthNonce();
auto ocsp = GetOCSPNonce();
auto ecdsa = GetECDSANonce();
auto dtls = GetDTLSCookie();
// All should be non-empty
ASSERT(!gcm.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!chacha.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!tls.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!ccm.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!jwt.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!oauth.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!ocsp.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!ecdsa.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(!dtls.IsEmpty());
});
LOG("=== All tests completed ===");
}

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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
uses
Core,
Core/SSL;
file
SecureRandomGenerator.cpp;
mainconfig
"" = "";

146
uppsrc/Core/SSL/Random.cpp Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
#include "SSL.h"
#define LLOG(x) // DLOG("SecureRandomGenerator: " << x)
namespace Upp {
namespace {
std::atomic<bool> sForked(false);
std::atomic<uint64> sId(0);
std::atomic<uint64> sCounter(0);
SpinLock sLock;
constexpr const int NONCE_MIN = 12;
constexpr const int NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN = 16;
inline void FillRandom(void* ptr, int len)
{
if(len <= 0)
return;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if(RAND_status() != 1) {
RAND_poll();
if(RAND_status() != 1)
throw Exc("SecureRandom: RNG not seeded");
}
#endif
if(RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<byte*>(ptr), len) != 1)
throw Exc("SecureRandom: RAND_bytes failed");
}
void Init()
{
static_assert(sizeof(uint64) == 8, "Secure random/nonce generator requires 64-bit integers");
SslInitThread();
ONCELOCK {
uint32 seed = 0;
FillRandom(&seed, sizeof(seed));
sCounter = (uint64) seed;
#ifdef PLATFORM_POSIX
pthread_atfork(nullptr, nullptr, [] {
sForked = true;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
RAND_cleanup();
#endif
});
#endif
}
}
void HandleFork()
{
#ifdef PLATFORM_POSIX
if(!sForked.load())
return;
// After fork(), child inherits RNG state. We must reseed once to avoid
// nonce/counter reuse. SpinLock ensures only one thread performs reseed
// while others wait until state becomes consistent.
SpinLock::Lock __(sLock);
if(sForked.load()) {
uint32 seed = 0;
FillRandom(&seed, sizeof(seed));
sCounter = (uint64) seed;
sId = 0;
sForked = false;
}
#endif
}
uint64 GetNonceDomainId()
{
if(uint64 v = sId.load(); v)
return v;
uint64 x = 0;
FillRandom(&x, sizeof(x));
if(!x) x = 1;
uint64 expected = 0;
if(sId.compare_exchange_strong(expected, x))
return x;
return sId.load();
}
uint64 NextCounter()
{
// simple atomic increment is enough here
uint64 v = ++sCounter;
if(v == 0)
throw Exc("SecureRandom: counter overflow");
return v;
}
}
SecureBuffer<byte> SecureRandom(int n)
{
Init();
HandleFork();
n = max(1, n);
SecureBuffer<byte> out(n);
FillRandom(~out, n);
return pick(out);
}
SecureBuffer<byte> SecureNonce(int n)
{
Init();
HandleFork();
uint64 did = GetNonceDomainId();
uint64 cnt = NextCounter();
n = max(n, NONCE_MIN);
SecureBuffer<byte> out(n);
byte *p = ~out;
// 12-15 byte layout
// 4 bytes PID | 8 bytes counter | [random tail]
if(n < NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN) {
Poke32(p, (dword) did);
p += sizeof(dword);
Poke64(p, (int64) cnt);
p += sizeof(int64);
if(int len = n - NONCE_MIN; len > 0)
FillRandom(p, len);
return pick(out);
}
// 16-byte structured layout
// 8 bytes PID | 8 bytes counter | [random tail]
Poke64(p, (int64) did);
p += sizeof(int64);
Poke64(p, (int64) cnt);
p += sizeof(int64);
if(int len = n - NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN; len > 0)
FillRandom(p, len);
return pick(out);
}
}

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@ -185,4 +185,21 @@ bool AES256Decrypt(Stream& in, const String& password, Stream& out, Gate<int64,
// Secure buffer
#include "Buffer.hpp"
// Secure Random Generator
SecureBuffer<byte> SecureRandom(int n);
SecureBuffer<byte> SecureNonce(int n);
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetAESGCMNonce() { return SecureNonce(12); } // 12 bytes, optimal for AES-GCM
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce() { return SecureNonce(12); } // 12 bytes, standard for ChaCha20-Poly1305
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetTLSNonce() { return SecureNonce(12); } // 12 bytes, used in TLS 1.2/1.3
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetAESCCMNonce() { return SecureNonce(13); } // 13 bytes, max size for AES-CCM
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetJWTNonce() { return SecureNonce(16); } // 16 bytes, good for JWT
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetOAuthNonce() { return SecureNonce(16); } // 16 bytes, common for OAuth
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetOCSPNonce() { return SecureNonce(20); } // 20 bytes, OCSP nonce extension
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetECDSANonce() { return SecureNonce(32); } // 32 bytes, for ECDSA signatures
inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetDTLSCookie() { return SecureNonce(32); } // 32 bytes, DTLS cookie
}

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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ file
P7S.cpp,
AES.cpp,
Buffer.hpp,
Random.cpp,
SSL.icpp,
Docs readonly separator,
src.tpp,

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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
topic "Secure random data and nonce generation";
[i448;a25;kKO9;2 $$1,0#37138531426314131252341829483380:class]
[l288;2 $$2,2#27521748481378242620020725143825:desc]
[0 $$3,0#96390100711032703541132217272105:end]
[H6;0 $$4,0#05600065144404261032431302351956:begin]
[i448;a25;kKO9;2 $$5,0#37138531426314131252341829483370:item]
[l288;a4;*@5;1 $$6,6#70004532496200323422659154056402:requirement]
[l288;i1121;b17;O9;~~~.1408;2 $$7,0#10431211400427159095818037425705:param]
[i448;b42;O9;2 $$8,8#61672508125594000341940100500538:tparam]
[b42;2 $$9,9#13035079074754324216151401829390:normal]
[2 $$0,0#00000000000000000000000000000000:Default]
[{_}
[ {{10000@(113.42.0) [s0;%% [*@7;4 Secure Random and Nonce Generators]]}}&]
[s2; &]
[s2;%% These functions provides a cryptographically secure random
number and nonces compliant with NIST SP 800`-38D, tailored for
high`-security applications that demand guaranteed uniqueness
and strong collision resistance. The implementation ensures
process`-unique nonces and is fork`-safe on POSIX systems, automatically
reseeding after a fork to avoid duplication. &]
[s2;%% &]
[s2;%% The implementation is [/ thread`-safe], supporting concurrent
initialization and generation across threads without race conditions.
It enforces a minimum nonce size of 12 bytes, aligning with cryptographic
standards. &]
[s2;%% &]
[s2;%% The generator offers two distinct modes: one for producing
unique, non`-repeating nonces, and another for extracting purely
random data suitable for general`-purpose cryptographic use.&]
[s2; &]
[s3; &]
[ {{10000F(128)G(128)@1 [s0;%% [* Function List]]}}&]
[s3; &]
[s5;:Upp`:`:SecureRandom`(int`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* SecureRandom]([@(0.0.255) i
nt] [*@3 n])&]
[s2;%% Generates [%-*@3 n] cryptographically secure random bytes. Enforces
a minimum size of 1 bytes. Throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
xception ]on failure.&]
[s3; &]
[s4; &]
[s5;:Upp`:`:SecureNonce`(int`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* SecureNonce]([@(0.0.255) i
nt] [*@3 n])&]
[s0;l288;%% Generates a secure nonce of [%-*@3 n] bytes. Enforces a
minimum size of 12 bytes. Throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
xception ]on failure. The returned value is a structured binary
nonce produced from internal&]
[s2;%% domain, counter, and optional entropy components. All internal
multi`-byte fields are encoded using little`-endian layout.&]
[s3; &]
[ {{10000F(128)G(128)@1 [s0;%% [* Standard Nonce Helpers]]}}&]
[s3; &]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetAESGCMNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetAESGCMNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]>
[* GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetTLSNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetTLSNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetAESCCMNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetAESCCMNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetJWTNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetJWTNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetOAuthNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetOAuthNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetOCSPNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetOCSPNonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetECDSANonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetECDSANonce]()&]
[s5;:Upp`:`:GetDTLSCookie`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetDTLSCookie]()&]
[s2;%% These helper functions generate cryptographically secure nonces
of commonly required lengths for widely used protocols and standards
such as AES`-GCM, ChaCha20`-Poly1305, TLS, JWT, and ECDSA. Each
helper ensures the nonce meets the expected size and uniqueness
guarantees of its respective use case. Each helper throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
xception ]on failure.&]
[s3; &]
[s0;%% ]]