diff --git a/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.cpp b/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd070dc22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+#include <Core/Core.h>
+#include <Core/SSL/SSL.h>
+
+using namespace Upp;
+
+CONSOLE_APP_MAIN
+{
+    StdLogSetup(LOG_COUT | LOG_FILE);
+	
+	auto Test = [](const String& name, const Function<void()>& fn) {
+		String txt = "---" + name + ": ";
+		try {
+			fn();
+			txt << "PASSED";
+		}
+		catch(...) {
+			txt << "FAILED";
+		}
+		LOG(txt);
+	};
+	
+	Test("Basic functionality", [] {
+		ASSERT(SecureNonce(16).GetSize() == 16);
+		ASSERT(SecureNonce(64).GetSize() == 64);
+		ASSERT(SecureNonce(12).GetSize() == 12);
+		ASSERT(!SecureNonce(16).IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(SecureNonce(1).GetSize() == 12);  // Enforce minimum
+		ASSERT(SecureRandom(0).GetSize() == 1); // Enforce minimum
+	});
+	
+	Test("Standard nonce helpers, length check", [] {
+		ASSERT(GetAESGCMNonce().GetSize() == 12);
+		ASSERT(GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce().GetSize() == 12);
+		ASSERT(GetTLSNonce().GetSize() == 12);
+		ASSERT(GetAESCCMNonce().GetSize() == 13);
+		ASSERT(GetJWTNonce().GetSize() == 16);
+		ASSERT(GetOAuthNonce().GetSize() == 16);
+		ASSERT(GetOCSPNonce().GetSize() == 20);
+		ASSERT(GetECDSANonce().GetSize() == 32);
+		ASSERT(GetDTLSCookie().GetSize() == 32);
+	});
+	
+	Test("SecureRandom basic checks", [] {
+		auto buf = SecureRandom(32);
+		ASSERT(buf.GetSize() == 32);
+		ASSERT(!buf.IsEmpty());
+		
+		// Verify it's not all zeros
+		bool has_nonzero = false;
+		for(size_t i = 0; i < buf.GetSize(); i++) {
+			if(buf[i] != 0) {
+				has_nonzero = true;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		ASSERT(has_nonzero);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Uniqueness (single-threaded)", [] {
+		const int NONCE_COUNT = 1000;
+		Vector<String> nonces;
+		nonces.Reserve(NONCE_COUNT);
+		
+		for(int i = 0; i < NONCE_COUNT; i++) {
+			auto buf = SecureNonce(12);
+			nonces.Add(String((const char*)~buf, buf.GetSize()));
+		}
+		
+		Sort(nonces);
+		for(int i = 1; i < nonces.GetCount(); i++)
+			ASSERT(nonces[i] != nonces[i - 1]);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Uniqueness (multi-threaded)", [] {
+		const int THREAD_COUNT = CPU_Cores();
+		const int NONCES_PER_THREAD = 100000;
+		Vector<String> all_nonces;
+		
+		CoFor(THREAD_COUNT, [&all_nonces](int n) {
+			Vector<String> nonces;
+			nonces.Reserve(NONCES_PER_THREAD);
+			
+			for(int i = 0; i < NONCES_PER_THREAD; i++) {
+				auto buf = SecureNonce(12);
+				nonces.Add(String((const char*)~buf, buf.GetSize()));
+			}
+			
+			CoWork::FinLock();
+			all_nonces.AppendPick(pick(nonces));
+		});
+		
+		ASSERT(all_nonces.GetCount() == THREAD_COUNT * NONCES_PER_THREAD);
+		Sort(all_nonces);
+		
+		for(int i = 1; i < all_nonces.GetCount(); i++)
+			ASSERT(all_nonces[i] != all_nonces[i - 1]);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Verify nonce internal structure (12-15 byte nonces)", [] {
+		auto nonce1 = SecureNonce(12);
+		auto nonce2 = SecureNonce(12);
+		
+		// First 4 bytes (process ID) should be identical
+		ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce1, ~nonce2, 4) == 0);
+		
+		// Next 8 bytes (counter) should differ
+		uint64 counter1 = Peek64(~nonce1 + 4);
+		uint64 counter2 = Peek64(~nonce2 + 4);
+		ASSERT(counter1 != counter2);
+		
+		// Expect sequential or very close counters
+		// Allow for other threads potentially getting nonces in between
+		uint64 diff = (counter2 > counter1) ? (counter2 - counter1) : (counter1 - counter2);
+		ASSERT(diff <= 100);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Verify nonce internal structure (16+ byte nonces)", [] {
+		auto nonce1 = SecureNonce(16);
+		auto nonce2 = SecureNonce(16);
+		
+		// First 8 bytes (process ID) should be identical
+		ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce1, ~nonce2, 8) == 0);
+		
+		// Next 8 bytes (counter) should differ
+		uint64 counter1 = Peek64(~nonce1 + 8);
+		uint64 counter2 = Peek64(~nonce2 + 8);
+		ASSERT(counter1 != counter2);
+		
+		uint64 diff = (counter2 > counter1) ? (counter2 - counter1) : (counter1 - counter2);
+		ASSERT(diff <= 100);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Verify nonce entropy (using chi-square method)", [] {
+		const int NONCE_SIZE = 32;                          // Total nonce size
+		const int RANDOM_OFFSET = 16;                       // Skip 8B PID + 8B counter
+		const int RANDOM_SIZE = NONCE_SIZE - RANDOM_OFFSET;
+		const int SAMPLE_COUNT = 1000;
+		const double CHI_SQUARE_THRESHOLD = 350.0;          // 99% confidence
+		
+		String random_bytes;
+		random_bytes.Reserve(SAMPLE_COUNT * RANDOM_SIZE);
+		
+		// Generate samples
+		for(int i = 0; i < SAMPLE_COUNT; ++i) {
+			auto nonce = SecureNonce(NONCE_SIZE);
+			random_bytes.Cat((const char*)(~nonce + RANDOM_OFFSET), RANDOM_SIZE);
+		}
+		
+		// Frequency analysis
+		Vector<int> freq(256, 0);
+		const byte* data = (const byte*)(const char*)random_bytes;
+		for(int i = 0; i < random_bytes.GetLength(); ++i)
+			freq[data[i]]++;
+		
+		// Chi-square test
+		double expected = random_bytes.GetLength() / 256.0;
+		double chi2 = 0.0;
+		for(int count : freq) {
+			double delta = count - expected;
+			chi2 += (delta * delta) / expected;
+		}
+		
+		ASSERT(chi2 < CHI_SQUARE_THRESHOLD);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Verify different nonce sizes use correct layouts", [] {
+		// 12-byte nonce: [4B PID | 8B counter]
+		auto nonce12 = SecureNonce(12);
+		ASSERT(nonce12.GetSize() == 12);
+		
+		// 14-byte nonce: [4B PID | 8B counter | 2B random]
+		auto nonce14 = SecureNonce(14);
+		ASSERT(nonce14.GetSize() == 14);
+		
+		// 16-byte nonce: [8B PID | 8B counter]
+		auto nonce16 = SecureNonce(16);
+		ASSERT(nonce16.GetSize() == 16);
+		
+		// 32-byte nonce: [8B PID | 8B counter | 16B random]
+		auto nonce32 = SecureNonce(32);
+		ASSERT(nonce32.GetSize() == 32);
+		
+		// Verify PID portions match where expected
+		// For <16 byte nonces, compare first 4 bytes
+		ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce12, ~nonce14, 4) == 0);
+		
+		// For >=16 byte nonces, compare first 8 bytes
+		ASSERT(memcmp(~nonce16, ~nonce32, 8) == 0);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Concurrent nonce generation stress test", [] {
+		const int THREAD_COUNT = 16;
+		const int NONCES_PER_THREAD = 10000;
+		std::atomic<int> total_generated{0};
+		
+		CoFor(THREAD_COUNT, [&total_generated](int n) {
+			for(int i = 0; i < NONCES_PER_THREAD; i++) {
+				auto nonce = SecureNonce(16);
+				ASSERT(nonce.GetSize() == 16);
+				ASSERT(!nonce.IsEmpty());
+			}
+			total_generated += NONCES_PER_THREAD;
+		});
+		
+		ASSERT(total_generated == THREAD_COUNT * NONCES_PER_THREAD);
+	});
+	
+	Test("Helper functions return correct types", [] {
+		// Verify all helpers return SecureBuffer<byte>
+		auto gcm = GetAESGCMNonce();
+		auto chacha = GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce();
+		auto tls = GetTLSNonce();
+		auto ccm = GetAESCCMNonce();
+		auto jwt = GetJWTNonce();
+		auto oauth = GetOAuthNonce();
+		auto ocsp = GetOCSPNonce();
+		auto ecdsa = GetECDSANonce();
+		auto dtls = GetDTLSCookie();
+		
+		// All should be non-empty
+		ASSERT(!gcm.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!chacha.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!tls.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!ccm.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!jwt.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!oauth.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!ocsp.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!ecdsa.IsEmpty());
+		ASSERT(!dtls.IsEmpty());
+	});
+	
+	LOG("=== All tests completed ===");
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.upp b/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.upp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc3c36a64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/autotest/SecureRandomGenerator/SecureRandomGenerator.upp
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+uses
+	Core,
+	Core/SSL;
+
+file
+	SecureRandomGenerator.cpp;
+
+mainconfig
+	"" = "";
+
diff --git a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/Random.cpp b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/Random.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c2159a8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/Random.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#include "SSL.h"
+
+#define LLOG(x) // DLOG("SecureRandomGenerator: " << x)
+
+namespace Upp {
+
+namespace {
+
+std::atomic<bool>   sForked(false);
+std::atomic<uint64> sId(0);
+std::atomic<uint64> sCounter(0);
+SpinLock            sLock;
+
+constexpr const int NONCE_MIN = 12;
+constexpr const int NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN = 16;
+
+inline void FillRandom(void* ptr, int len)
+{
+    if(len <= 0)
+        return;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+    if(RAND_status() != 1) {
+        RAND_poll();
+        if(RAND_status() != 1)
+            throw Exc("SecureRandom: RNG not seeded");
+    }
+#endif
+    if(RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<byte*>(ptr), len) != 1)
+        throw Exc("SecureRandom: RAND_bytes failed");
+}
+
+void Init()
+{
+	static_assert(sizeof(uint64) == 8, "Secure random/nonce generator requires 64-bit integers");
+	
+	SslInitThread();
+
+	ONCELOCK {
+		uint32 seed = 0;
+		FillRandom(&seed, sizeof(seed));
+		sCounter = (uint64) seed;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_POSIX
+		pthread_atfork(nullptr, nullptr, [] {
+			sForked = true;
+		#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+			RAND_cleanup();
+		#endif
+		});
+#endif
+	}
+}
+
+
+void HandleFork()
+{
+#ifdef PLATFORM_POSIX
+    if(!sForked.load())
+        return;
+    // After fork(), child inherits RNG state. We must reseed once to avoid
+    // nonce/counter reuse. SpinLock ensures only one thread performs reseed
+    // while others wait until state becomes consistent.
+    SpinLock::Lock __(sLock);
+    if(sForked.load()) {
+        uint32 seed = 0;
+        FillRandom(&seed, sizeof(seed));
+        sCounter = (uint64) seed;
+        sId = 0;
+        sForked = false;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+uint64 GetNonceDomainId()
+{
+	if(uint64 v = sId.load(); v)
+		return v;
+
+	uint64 x = 0;
+	FillRandom(&x, sizeof(x));
+	if(!x) x = 1;
+
+	uint64 expected = 0;
+	if(sId.compare_exchange_strong(expected, x))
+		return x;
+
+	return sId.load();
+}
+
+uint64 NextCounter()
+{
+	// simple atomic increment is enough here
+	uint64 v = ++sCounter;
+	if(v == 0)
+		throw Exc("SecureRandom: counter overflow");
+	return v;
+}
+
+}
+
+SecureBuffer<byte> SecureRandom(int n)
+{
+	Init();
+	HandleFork();
+	n = max(1, n);
+	SecureBuffer<byte> out(n);
+	FillRandom(~out, n);
+	return pick(out);
+}
+
+SecureBuffer<byte> SecureNonce(int n)
+{
+	Init();
+	HandleFork();
+	uint64 did = GetNonceDomainId();
+	uint64 cnt = NextCounter();
+
+	n = max(n, NONCE_MIN);
+	SecureBuffer<byte> out(n);
+
+	byte *p = ~out;
+
+	// 12-15 byte layout
+	// 4 bytes PID | 8 bytes counter | [random tail]
+	if(n < NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN) {
+		Poke32(p, (dword) did);
+		p += sizeof(dword);
+		Poke64(p, (int64) cnt);
+		p += sizeof(int64);
+		if(int len = n - NONCE_MIN; len > 0)
+			FillRandom(p, len);
+		return pick(out);
+	}
+
+	// 16-byte structured layout
+	// 8 bytes PID | 8 bytes counter | [random tail]
+	Poke64(p, (int64) did);
+	p += sizeof(int64);
+	Poke64(p, (int64) cnt);
+	p += sizeof(int64);
+	if(int len = n - NONCE_STRUCTURED_MIN; len > 0)
+		FillRandom(p, len);
+	return pick(out);
+}
+
+
+}
diff --git a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.h b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.h
index 1c14a4478..bae2155d2 100644
--- a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.h
+++ b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.h
@@ -185,4 +185,21 @@ bool AES256Decrypt(Stream& in, const String& password, Stream& out, Gate<int64,
 
 // Secure buffer
 #include "Buffer.hpp"
+
+
+
+// Secure Random Generator
+SecureBuffer<byte> SecureRandom(int n);
+SecureBuffer<byte> SecureNonce(int n);
+
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetAESGCMNonce()          { return SecureNonce(12); }  // 12 bytes, optimal for AES-GCM
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce()  { return SecureNonce(12); }  // 12 bytes, standard for ChaCha20-Poly1305
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetTLSNonce()             { return SecureNonce(12); }  // 12 bytes, used in TLS 1.2/1.3
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetAESCCMNonce()          { return SecureNonce(13); }  // 13 bytes, max size for AES-CCM
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetJWTNonce()             { return SecureNonce(16); }  // 16 bytes, good for JWT
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetOAuthNonce()           { return SecureNonce(16); }  // 16 bytes, common for OAuth
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetOCSPNonce()            { return SecureNonce(20); }  // 20 bytes, OCSP nonce extension
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetECDSANonce()           { return SecureNonce(32); }  // 32 bytes, for ECDSA signatures
+inline SecureBuffer<byte> GetDTLSCookie()           { return SecureNonce(32); }  // 32 bytes, DTLS cookie
+
 }
diff --git a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.upp b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.upp
index e667f1781..783364bd2 100644
--- a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.upp
+++ b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/SSL.upp
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ file
 	P7S.cpp,
 	AES.cpp,
 	Buffer.hpp,
+	Random.cpp,
 	SSL.icpp,
 	Docs readonly separator,
 	src.tpp,
diff --git a/uppsrc/Core/SSL/src.tpp/Upp_SSL_Random_en-us.tpp b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/src.tpp/Upp_SSL_Random_en-us.tpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00b619526
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uppsrc/Core/SSL/src.tpp/Upp_SSL_Random_en-us.tpp
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+topic "Secure random data and nonce generation";
+[i448;a25;kKO9;2 $$1,0#37138531426314131252341829483380:class]
+[l288;2 $$2,2#27521748481378242620020725143825:desc]
+[0 $$3,0#96390100711032703541132217272105:end]
+[H6;0 $$4,0#05600065144404261032431302351956:begin]
+[i448;a25;kKO9;2 $$5,0#37138531426314131252341829483370:item]
+[l288;a4;*@5;1 $$6,6#70004532496200323422659154056402:requirement]
+[l288;i1121;b17;O9;~~~.1408;2 $$7,0#10431211400427159095818037425705:param]
+[i448;b42;O9;2 $$8,8#61672508125594000341940100500538:tparam]
+[b42;2 $$9,9#13035079074754324216151401829390:normal]
+[2 $$0,0#00000000000000000000000000000000:Default]
+[{_} 
+[ {{10000@(113.42.0) [s0;%% [*@7;4 Secure Random and Nonce Generators]]}}&]
+[s2; &]
+[s2;%% These functions provides a cryptographically secure random 
+number and nonces compliant with NIST SP 800`-38D, tailored for 
+high`-security applications that demand guaranteed uniqueness 
+and strong collision resistance.  The implementation ensures 
+process`-unique nonces and is fork`-safe on POSIX systems, automatically 
+reseeding after a fork to avoid duplication. &]
+[s2;%% &]
+[s2;%% The implementation is [/ thread`-safe], supporting concurrent 
+initialization and generation across threads without race conditions. 
+It enforces a minimum nonce size of 12 bytes, aligning with cryptographic 
+standards. &]
+[s2;%% &]
+[s2;%% The generator offers two distinct modes: one for producing 
+unique, non`-repeating nonces,  and another for extracting purely 
+random data suitable for general`-purpose cryptographic use.&]
+[s2; &]
+[s3; &]
+[ {{10000F(128)G(128)@1 [s0;%% [* Function List]]}}&]
+[s3; &]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:SecureRandom`(int`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* SecureRandom]([@(0.0.255) i
+nt] [*@3 n])&]
+[s2;%% Generates [%-*@3 n] cryptographically secure random bytes. Enforces 
+a minimum size of 1 bytes. Throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
+xception ]on failure.&]
+[s3; &]
+[s4; &]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:SecureNonce`(int`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* SecureNonce]([@(0.0.255) i
+nt] [*@3 n])&]
+[s0;l288;%% Generates a secure nonce of [%-*@3 n] bytes. Enforces a 
+minimum size of 12 bytes. Throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
+xception ]on failure. The returned value is a structured binary 
+nonce produced from internal&]
+[s2;%% domain, counter, and optional entropy components. All internal 
+multi`-byte fields are encoded using little`-endian layout.&]
+[s3; &]
+[ {{10000F(128)G(128)@1 [s0;%% [* Standard Nonce Helpers]]}}&]
+[s3; &]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetAESGCMNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetAESGCMNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> 
+[* GetChaChaPoly1305Nonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetTLSNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetTLSNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetAESCCMNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetAESCCMNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetJWTNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetJWTNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetOAuthNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetOAuthNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetOCSPNonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetOCSPNonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetECDSANonce`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetECDSANonce]()&]
+[s5;:Upp`:`:GetDTLSCookie`(`): SecureBuffer<[@(0.255.0) byte]> [* GetDTLSCookie]()&]
+[s2;%% These helper functions generate cryptographically secure nonces 
+of commonly required lengths for widely used protocols and standards 
+such as AES`-GCM, ChaCha20`-Poly1305, TLS, JWT, and ECDSA. Each 
+helper ensures the nonce meets the expected size and uniqueness 
+guarantees of its respective use case. Each helper throws [^topic`:`/`/Core`/src`/Exc`_en`-us`#Exc`:`:class^ e
+xception ]on failure.&]
+[s3; &]
+[s0;%% ]]
\ No newline at end of file