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[GH-ISSUE #2808] KDE Plasma 5.16: file pickers and Dolphin require access to ${HOME}/.config/kioslaverc #1761
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Reference: github-starred/firejail#1761
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Originally created by @ayhc on GitHub (Jun 28, 2019).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/2808
Running Fedora 30 (with Plasma 5.16 from a third-party repo) and Firejail 0.9.60.
Actual behaviour: Opening Dolphin, or opening the file picker in LibreOffice, results in an error message saying that ${HOME}/.config/kioslaverc cannot be accessed.
Expected behaviour: No error message
Workaround: Manually add the following to the Dolphin and LibreOffice profiles:
noblacklist ${HOME}/.config/kioslaverc@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jun 29, 2019):
Can you please check if, instead of noblacklisting,
read-write ${HOME}/.config/kioslavercresolves the issue as well? And is there something broken or you just see a warning?@ayhc commented on GitHub (Jun 29, 2019):
read-write ${HOME}/.config/kioslavercdid not solve the problem.I did not see any breakage other than the warning message.
@dalechyn commented on GitHub (Jun 29, 2019):
I am using Plasma with Dolphin, but on the ParrotOS and haven't met this issue.
@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jun 29, 2019):
Firejail doesn't blacklist this file in the default configuration, did you maybe add this command somewhere?
@ayhc commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
Haven't added kioslaverc to any blacklists - ran
grep -r kioslavercin /etc/firejail and got this:(I added libreoffice.local and dolphin.local as a workaround, as discussed above)
@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
@ayhc just to be complete, you also didn't add it under ~/.config/firejail?
@ayhc commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
@rusty-snake can confirm that ~/.config/firejail is empty.
@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
I think you are not using firejail compiled from git, so #1235 would be the answer why noblacklist works even there is no blacklist.
@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
@ayhc try
ignore read-only ${HOME}/.config/kioslaverc@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
may related to #2480.
@ayhc commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
@rusty-snake
ignore read-only ${HOME}/.config/kioslavercworks.@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 2, 2019):
I played a little bit and think I found the issue.
Where do you add the
read-write? Theread-writemust parsed after theread-only.=> To add
read-writeto.local(or as an command line argument) files doesn't work, it must be added afterinclude disable-common.inc.@ayhc, can you confirm that the following also work:
@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jul 5, 2019):
On another note, I find it quite surprising that a file picker asks for write access to kioslaverc.
If there are no problems with functionality, it should be ok to just ignore this warning.
@Vincent43 commented on GitHub (Jul 6, 2019):
Is
kioslavercsecurity sensitive file?@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
I think so, KDE apps go there to check if a proxy server should be used.
On yet another note, should Gnome's dconf database be read-only as well?
@ghost commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
@smitsohu
${HOME}/.config/dconf is in
whitelist-common.inc. Making it read-only would cripple user config changes for GNOME apps. We already have a great override mechanism with the *.local files, so if it is made read-only the worst-case scenario is that people who like it will have to override. We could safely make it read-only for profiles that don't need the GNOME-specific functionality (e.g. KDE apps, daemons), but for those we can just as well blacklist it alltogether IMHO.@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
But iirc all writes to the database are via D-Bus. This would mean dconf writes escape the sandbox as long as there is no
nodbusoption.In my fantasy (I cannot try it out in this moment) only the daemon would need a
ignore read-only ${HOME}/.config/dconf.@ghost commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
@smitsohu You're correct. As far as I know all dconf access relies on D-Bus, I don't see GNOME changing that any time soon. Only now that you pointed out explicitly that without
nodbusall profiles writing to dconf are inherently insecure I get where you're going with this. That does indeed change things rather dramatically. We should test your fantasy and act accordingly :+:.@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
Use
xdg-dbus-proxyhttps://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/2683#issuecomment-491023735 ornetns-exechttps://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/2683#issuecomment-495919268.On restricting dbus sandbox escape we can do more.
@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Jul 7, 2019):
Possibly an attacker doesn't even need to use the D-Bus interface. If I understand it right this is just a convention, thought to reduce the risk of database corruption.
The database is user writable, a malicious process can (possibly) go to the file directly. If that is the case, it would be useful to mount it read-only (especially as it is exposed through whitelist-common.inc).
@rusty-snake commented on GitHub (Aug 1, 2019):
@ayhc
I'm closing here due to inactivity, please fell free to reopen if you still have this issue.