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[GH-ISSUE #1660] firefox profile leaking filesystem access #1121
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Reference: github-starred/firejail#1121
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Originally created by @Boruch-Baum on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/1660
The firefox profile is said to limit the browser's access to the user's filesystem to ~/Downloads and certain other specific files. However, my firefox file dialog (version 52 esr) includes at the bottom of the left-hand bookmark / location bar, an item labeled "other locations", and clicking on that shows that firefox has access to all filesystems / devices through that method.
@Fred-Barclay commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
G'day Boruch-Baum,
The firefox profile limits any access in your home directory to Downloads and a few necessary config files. It also strictly limits or prevents access to select other directories like /boot, /dev, /root, and /tmp.
Also, it prevents lots of potential attacks thanks to the seccomp filter and noroot/nonewprivs filters.
Other system files, such as those in /etc or /lib, are visible, though read-only, inside the sandbox. This is by design.
@netblue30 or some other contributors can certainly explain it better than I can, but in the meantime these links may be of interest to you. 😄
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/1352
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/354
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/970
Cheers!
Fred
@Boruch-Baum commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@Fred-Barclay: G'day. Your comment doesn't reflect my experience and seems to ignore what I actually reported, so I should be more specific.
1] Open an instance of firefox using firejail.
2] Open any URL, local or remote.
3] Type C-s (Control-s).
4] Within the save dialog that appears, click on the "Other Locations" line at the bottom of the bookmark bar on the left-hand side of the dialog.
5] Notice that you can now view all mount-points system-wide, including other unmounted partitions, USB drives, network connections, etc.
Nothing to do with access to /etc or /lib, as you commented, and in fact I don't see that I actually have access to those directories at all.
@SkewedZeppelin commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@Boruch-Baum if you want to block access to other drives you can run this command as root:
echo "disable-mnt" >> /etc/firejail/firefox.local@smitsohu commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@Boruch-Baum for clarification: Is this issue about information leaking?
I tried to reproduce and I can see some forbidden fruit, but I am not able to actually access it.
@Boruch-Baum commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@SpotComms: That did it! Thanks. Should this be made standard? Or has it been, and my version (0.9.50) is just not bleeding edge?
@smitsohu: Yes. Before @SpotComms tip, I was able to drill down past the initial display of mount points and access to everything that my user account had access. After the tip, the behavior is as I think you are reporting - able to see the initial list of mount points, but not able to drill down.
Ideally, the mount points themselves should be hidden, no?
@SkewedZeppelin commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@Boruch-Baum I actually added it in
5354f20012 (diff-e1a5f71d78072f938239e39011f8bd73), but removed it in9e3ba319be, it was never enabled however.I left it disabled for the browsers for the few users that might keep their Downloads directory on another drive.
@Boruch-Baum commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
@SpotComms : OK. On your judgement, close the issue. My vote is to enable the protection for the many, and force the few to make the manual change.
@Boruch-Baum commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
Also in favor of enabling the protection by default is that the minority who have their ~/Downloads directory on another mount point can still temporarily save data to their $HOME directory, which the firejail profile also allows by default.
@Fred-Barclay commented on GitHub (Nov 28, 2017):
I agree that we may want to consider using
disable-mntmore liberally.@Fred-Barclay commented on GitHub (Nov 30, 2017):
Mount points have been disabled for browsers in
19f9beca32. 🎉@Boruch-Baum commented on GitHub (Dec 1, 2017):
Thanks, @Fred-Barclay.