Landlock support has been added.

2026-05-15 14:16:14 -06:00 · 2022-08-15 12:19:11 +05:00 · 2022-08-15 12:19:11 +05:00 · 61b1544289
commit 61b1544289
parent 5ab4aeb35c
15 changed files with 316 additions and 3 deletions
--- a/config.mk.in
+++ b/config.mk.in
@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME=@HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME@
 HAVE_IDS=@HAVE_IDS@
 HAVE_GCOV=@HAVE_GCOV@
 HAVE_SELINUX=@HAVE_SELINUX@
+HAVE_LANDLOCK=@HAVE_LANDLOCK@
 HAVE_SUID=@HAVE_SUID@
 HAVE_DBUSPROXY=@HAVE_DBUSPROXY@
 HAVE_USERTMPFS=@HAVE_USERTMPFS@
@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ HAVE_LTS=@HAVE_LTS@
 HAVE_FORCE_NONEWPRIVS=@HAVE_FORCE_NONEWPRIVS@
 HAVE_ONLY_SYSCFG_PROFILES=@HAVE_ONLY_SYSCFG_PROFILES@

-MANFLAGS = $(HAVE_LTS) $(HAVE_OUTPUT) $(HAVE_X11) $(HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME) $(HAVE_APPARMOR) $(HAVE_IDS) $(HAVE_OVERLAYFS) $(HAVE_USERTMPFS) $(HAVE_DBUSPROXY) $(HAVE_FIRETUNNEL) $(HAVE_GLOBALCFG) $(HAVE_CHROOT) $(HAVE_NETWORK) $(HAVE_USERNS) $(HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER) $(HAVE_SELINUX) $(HAVE_SUID) $(HAVE_FORCE_NONEWPRIVS) $(HAVE_ONLY_SYSCFG_PROFILES)
+MANFLAGS = $(HAVE_LTS) $(HAVE_OUTPUT) $(HAVE_X11) $(HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME) $(HAVE_APPARMOR) $(HAVE_IDS) $(HAVE_OVERLAYFS) $(HAVE_USERTMPFS) $(HAVE_DBUSPROXY) $(HAVE_FIRETUNNEL) $(HAVE_GLOBALCFG) $(HAVE_CHROOT) $(HAVE_NETWORK) $(HAVE_USERNS) $(HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER) $(HAVE_SELINUX) $(HAVE_SUID) $(HAVE_LANDLOCK) $(HAVE_FORCE_NONEWPRIVS) $(HAVE_ONLY_SYSCFG_PROFILES)

 CC=@CC@
 CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
--- a/16
+++ b/16
@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ HAVE_DBUSPROXY
 EXTRA_LDFLAGS
 EXTRA_CFLAGS
 HAVE_SELINUX
+HAVE_LANDLOCK
 AA_LIBS
 AA_CFLAGS
 PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
@ -713,6 +714,7 @@ enable_sanitizer
 enable_ids
 enable_apparmor
 enable_selinux
+enable_landlock
 enable_dbusproxy
 enable_output
 enable_usertmpfs
@ -1374,6 +1376,7 @@ Optional Features:
  --enable-ids            enable ids
  --enable-apparmor       enable apparmor
  --enable-selinux        SELinux labeling support
+  --enable-landlock       Landlock self-restriction support
  --disable-dbusproxy     disable dbus proxy
  --disable-output        disable --output logging
  --disable-usertmpfs     disable tmpfs as regular user
@ -3342,7 +3345,19 @@ if test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"; then :

 fi

+HAVE_LANDLOCK=""

+# Check whether --enable-landlock was given.
+if test "${enable_landlock+set}" = set; then :
+  enableval=$enable_landlock;
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_landlock" = "xyes"; then :
+
+	HAVE_LANDLOCK="-DHAVE_LANDLOCK"
+	EXTRA_LDFLAGS="$EXTRA_LDFLAGS -ltinyll"
+
+fi



@ -5277,6 +5292,7 @@ Features:
   overlayfs support: $HAVE_OVERLAYFS
   private home support: $HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME
   SELinux labeling support: $HAVE_SELINUX
+   Landlock self-restriction support: $HAVE_LANDLOCK
   user namespace: $HAVE_USERNS
   X11 sandboxing support: $HAVE_X11

--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@ -81,10 +81,18 @@ AS_IF([test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"], [
 	EXTRA_LDFLAGS="$EXTRA_LDFLAGS -lselinux"
 ])

+HAVE_LANDLOCK=""
+AC_SUBST([HAVE_LANDLOCK])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([landlock])
+    [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-landlock], [Landlock self-restriction support])]
+AS_IF([test "x$enable_landlock" = "xyes"], [
+	HAVE_LANDLOCK="-DHAVE_LANDLOCK"
+	EXTRA_LDFLAGS="$EXTRA_LDFLAGS -ltinyll"
+])
+
 AC_SUBST([EXTRA_CFLAGS])
 AC_SUBST([EXTRA_LDFLAGS])

-
 HAVE_DBUSPROXY=""
 AC_SUBST([HAVE_DBUSPROXY])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([dbusproxy],
--- a/contrib/vim/syntax/firejail.vim
+++ b/contrib/vim/syntax/firejail.vim
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ syn match fjVar /\v\$\{(CFG|DESKTOP|DOCUMENTS|DOWNLOADS|HOME|MUSIC|PATH|PICTURES

 " Commands grabbed from: src/firejail/profile.c
 " Generate list with: { rg -o 'strn?cmp\(ptr, "([^"]+) "' -r '$1' src/firejail/profile.c; echo private-lib; } | grep -vEx '(include|ignore|caps\.drop|caps\.keep|protocol|restrict-namespaces|seccomp|seccomp\.drop|seccomp\.keep|env|rmenv|net|ip)' | sort -u | tr $'\n' '|' # private-lib is special-cased in the code and doesn't match the regex; grep-ed patterns are handled later with 'syn match nextgroup=' directives (except for include which is special-cased as a fjCommandNoCond keyword)
-syn match fjCommand /\v(apparmor|bind|blacklist|blacklist-nolog|cpu|defaultgw|dns|hostname|hosts-file|ip6|iprange|join-or-start|mac|mkdir|mkfile|mtu|name|netfilter|netfilter6|netmask|nice|noblacklist|noexec|nowhitelist|overlay-named|private|private-bin|private-cwd|private-etc|private-home|private-lib|private-opt|private-srv|read-only|read-write|rlimit-as|rlimit-cpu|rlimit-fsize|rlimit-nofile|rlimit-nproc|rlimit-sigpending|timeout|tmpfs|veth-name|whitelist|xephyr-screen) / skipwhite contained
+syn match fjCommand /\v(apparmor|bind|blacklist|blacklist-nolog|cpu|defaultgw|dns|hostname|hosts-file|ip6|iprange|join-or-start|landlock-read|landlock-write|landlock-restricted-write|landlock-execute|mac|mkdir|mkfile|mtu|name|netfilter|netfilter6|netmask|nice|noblacklist|noexec|nowhitelist|overlay-named|private|private-bin|private-cwd|private-etc|private-home|private-lib|private-opt|private-srv|read-only|read-write|rlimit-as|rlimit-cpu|rlimit-fsize|rlimit-nofile|rlimit-nproc|rlimit-sigpending|timeout|tmpfs|veth-name|whitelist|xephyr-screen) / skipwhite contained
 " Generate list with: rg -o 'strn?cmp\(ptr, "([^ "]*[^ ])"' -r '$1' src/firejail/profile.c | grep -vEx '(include|rlimit|quiet)' | sed -e 's/\./\\./' | sort -u | tr $'\n' '|' # include/rlimit are false positives, quiet is special-cased below
 syn match fjCommand /\v(allow-debuggers|allusers|apparmor|caps|deterministic-exit-code|deterministic-shutdown|disable-mnt|ipc-namespace|keep-config-pulse|keep-dev-shm|keep-fd|keep-var-tmp|machine-id|memory-deny-write-execute|netfilter|no3d|noautopulse|nodbus|nodvd|nogroups|noinput|nonewprivs|noprinters|noroot|nosound|notv|nou2f|novideo|overlay|overlay-tmpfs|private|private-cache|private-cwd|private-dev|private-lib|private-tmp|seccomp|seccomp\.32|seccomp\.block-secondary|tracelog|writable-etc|writable-run-user|writable-var|writable-var-log|x11)$/ contained
 syn match fjCommand /ignore / nextgroup=fjCommand,fjCommandNoCond skipwhite contained
--- a/src/bash_completion/firejail.bash_completion.in
+++ b/src/bash_completion/firejail.bash_completion.in
@ -42,6 +42,22 @@ _firejail()
            _filedir -d
            return 0
            ;;
+        --landlock-read)
+            _filedir
+            return 0
+            ;;
+        --landlock-write)
+            _filedir
+            return 0
+            ;;
+        --landlock-restricted-write)
+            _filedir
+            return 0
+            ;;
+        --landlock-execute)
+            _filedir
+            return 0
+            ;;
        --tmpfs)
            _filedir
            return 0
--- a/src/firejail/firejail.h
+++ b/src/firejail/firejail.h
@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include "../include/euid_common.h"
 #include "../include/rundefs.h"
 #include <linux/limits.h> // Note: Plain limits.h may break ARG_MAX (see #4583)
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>

@ -286,6 +287,8 @@ extern int arg_seccomp32;	// enable default seccomp filter for 32 bit arch
 extern int arg_seccomp_postexec;	// need postexec ld.preload library?
 extern int arg_seccomp_block_secondary;	// block any secondary architectures

+extern int arg_landlock; // Landlock ruleset file descriptor
+
 extern int arg_caps_default_filter;	// enable default capabilities filter
 extern int arg_caps_drop;		// drop list
 extern int arg_caps_drop_all;		// drop all capabilities
--- a/src/firejail/main.c
+++ b/src/firejail/main.c
@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #include "../include/gcov_wrapper.h"
 #include "../include/syscall.h"
 #include "../include/seccomp.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+#include "../include/tinyLL.h"
+#endif
 #define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sched.h>
@ -81,6 +84,10 @@ int arg_seccomp_postexec = 0;			// need postexec ld.preload library?
 int arg_seccomp_block_secondary = 0;		// block any secondary architectures
 int arg_seccomp_error_action = 0;

+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+int arg_landlock = -1;				// Landlock ruleset file descriptor (-1 if it doesn't exist)
+#endif
+
 int arg_caps_default_filter = 0;			// enable default capabilities filter
 int arg_caps_drop = 0;				// drop list
 int arg_caps_drop_all = 0;			// drop all capabilities
@ -1401,6 +1408,32 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) {
 			else
 				exit_err_feature("seccomp");
 		}
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+		else if (strncmp(argv[i], "--landlock-read=", 16) == 0) {
+			if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+			if (add_read_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, argv[i]+16)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+			}
+		}
+		else if (strncmp(argv[i], "--landlock-write=", 17) == 0) {
+			if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+			if (add_write_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, argv[i]+17,0)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+			}
+		}
+		else if (strncmp(argv[i], "--landlock-restricted-write=", 28) == 0) {
+			if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+			if (add_write_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, argv[i]+28,1)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+			}
+		}
+		else if (strncmp(argv[i], "--landlock-execute=", 19) == 0) {
+			if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+			if (add_execute_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, argv[i]+19)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+			}
+		}
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--memory-deny-write-execute") == 0) {
 			if (checkcfg(CFG_SECCOMP))
 				arg_memory_deny_write_execute = 1;
--- a/src/firejail/profile.c
+++ b/src/firejail/profile.c
@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 #include "../include/gcov_wrapper.h"
 #include "../include/seccomp.h"
 #include "../include/syscall.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+#include "../include/tinyLL.h"
+#endif
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>

@ -1045,6 +1048,38 @@ int profile_check_line(char *ptr, int lineno, const char *fname) {
 		return 0;
 	}

+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+	// Landlock ruleset paths
+	if (strncmp(ptr, "landlock-read ", 14) == 0) {
+		if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+		if (add_read_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, ptr+14)) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else if (strncmp(ptr, "landlock-write ", 15) == 0) {
+		if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+		if (add_write_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, ptr+15,0)) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else if (strncmp(ptr, "landlock-restricted-write ", 26) == 0) {
+		if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+		if (add_write_access_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, ptr+26,1)) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else if (strncmp(ptr, "landlock-execute ", 17) == 0) {
+		if (arg_landlock == -1) arg_landlock = create_full_ruleset();
+		if (add_execute_rule_by_path(arg_landlock, ptr+17)) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while adding a rule to the Landlock ruleset.\n");
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	// memory deny write&execute
 	if (strcmp(ptr, "memory-deny-write-execute") == 0) {
 		if (checkcfg(CFG_SECCOMP))
--- a/src/firejail/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/firejail/sandbox.c
@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 #include "firejail.h"
 #include "../include/gcov_wrapper.h"
 #include "../include/seccomp.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+#include "../include/tinyLL.h"
+#endif
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
@ -488,6 +491,16 @@ void start_application(int no_sandbox, int fd, char *set_sandbox_status) {
 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
 		set_apparmor();
 #endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+		// set Landlock
+		if (arg_landlock >= 0) {
+			if (landlock_restrict_self(arg_landlock,0)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"An error has occured while enabling Landlock self-restriction. Exiting...\n");
+				exit(1); // it isn't safe to continue if Landlock self-restriction was enabled and the "landlock_restrict_self" syscall has failed
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
 		close_file_descriptors();

 		// set nice and rlimits
--- a/src/firejail/usage.c
+++ b/src/firejail/usage.c
@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ static char *usage_str =
 	"    --keep-dev-shm - /dev/shm directory is untouched (even with --private-dev).\n"
 	"    --keep-fd - inherit open file descriptors to sandbox.\n"
 	"    --keep-var-tmp - /var/tmp directory is untouched.\n"
+	"    --landlock-read=path - add a read access rule for the path to the Landlock ruleset.\n"
+	"    --landlock-write=path - add a write access rule for the path to the Landlock ruleset.\n"
+	"    --landlock-restricted-write=path - add a write access rule that doesn't include creating FIFO pipes, Unix domain sockets and block devices for the path to the Landlock ruleset.\n"
+	"    --landlock-execute=path - add an execution-permitting rule for the path to the Landlock ruleset.\n"
 	"    --list - list all sandboxes.\n"
 #ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
 	"    --ls=name|pid dir_or_filename - list files in sandbox container.\n"
--- a/src/include/tinyLL.h
+++ b/src/include/tinyLL.h
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+extern int landlock_create_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset_attr *rsattr,size_t size,__u32 flags);
+
+extern int landlock_add_rule(int fd,enum landlock_rule_type t,void *attr,__u32 flags);
+
+extern int landlock_restrict_self(int fd,__u32 flags);
+
+extern int create_full_ruleset();
+
+extern int add_read_access_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd);
+
+extern int add_read_access_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path);
+
+extern int add_write_access_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd,int restricted);
+
+extern int add_write_access_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path,int restricted);
+
+extern int add_execute_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd);
+
+extern int add_execute_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path);
+
+extern int check_nnp();
+
+extern int enable_nnp();
--- a/src/lib/libtinyll.c
+++ b/src/lib/libtinyll.c
@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+
+int landlock_create_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset_attr *rsattr,size_t size,__u32 flags) {
+	return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset,rsattr,size,flags);
+}
+
+int landlock_add_rule(int fd,enum landlock_rule_type t,void *attr,__u32 flags) {
+	return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule,fd,t,attr,flags);
+}
+
+int landlock_restrict_self(int fd,__u32 flags) {
+	int result = syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self,fd,flags);
+	if (result!=0) return result;
+	else {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+int create_full_ruleset() {
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr;
+	attr.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	return landlock_create_ruleset(&attr,sizeof(attr),0);
+}
+
+int add_read_access_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd) {
+	int result;
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int add_read_access_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path) {
+	int result;
+	int allowed_fd = open(allowed_path,O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	close(allowed_fd);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int add_write_access_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd,int restricted) {
+	int result;
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	if (restricted==0) target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	else if (restricted==1) target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int add_write_access_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path,int restricted) {
+	int result;
+	int allowed_fd = open(allowed_path,O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	if (restricted==0) target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	else if (restricted==1) target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
+	else {
+		close(allowed_fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	close(allowed_fd);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int add_execute_rule(int rset_fd,int allowed_fd) {
+	int result;
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int add_execute_rule_by_path(int rset_fd,char *allowed_path) {
+	int result;
+	int allowed_fd = open(allowed_path,O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr target;
+	target.parent_fd = allowed_fd;
+	target.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
+	result = landlock_add_rule(rset_fd,LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,&target,0);
+	close(allowed_fd);
+	return result;
+}
+
+int check_nnp() {
+	return prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,0,0,0,0);
+}
+
+int enable_nnp() {
+	return prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,1,0,0,0);
+}
--- a/src/man/firejail-profile.txt
+++ b/src/man/firejail-profile.txt
@ -497,6 +497,27 @@ Blacklist all Linux capabilities.
 .TP
 \fBcaps.keep capability,capability,capability
 Whitelist given Linux capabilities.
+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+.TP
+\fBlandlock-read path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a read access rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fBlandlock-write path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a write access rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fBlandlock-restricted-write path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a write access rule for path. This type of write access doesn't include the permission to create Unix domain sockets, FIFO pipes and block devices. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fBlandlock-execute path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add an execution permission rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+#endif
 .TP
 \fBmemory-deny-write-execute
 Install a seccomp filter to block attempts to create memory mappings
--- a/src/man/firejail.txt
+++ b/src/man/firejail.txt
@ -1144,6 +1144,33 @@ Example:
 .br
 $ firejail --keep-var-tmp

+#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
+.TP
+\fB\-\-landlock-read=path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a read access rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fB\-\-landlock-write=path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a write access rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fB\-\-landlock-restricted-write=path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a write access rule for path. This type of write access doesn't include the permission to create Unix domain sockets, FIFO pipes and block devices. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.TP
+\fB\-\-landlock-execute=path
+Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add an execution permission rule for path. Note: if a process doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the "No New Privileges" restriction is not enabled, the Landlock self-restriction will fail and Firejail will exit with an error.
+.br
+
+.br
+Example:
+.br
+$ firejail \-\-landlock-read=/ \-\-landlock-restricted-write=/home \-\-landlock-execute=/usr
+#endif
+
 .TP
 \fB\-\-list
 List all sandboxes, see \fBMONITORING\fR section for more details.
@ -1261,6 +1288,7 @@ $ firejail --list
 .br
 1312:netblue:browser-1312:firejail --name=browser --private firefox --no-remote
 .br
+
 #ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
 .TP
 \fB\-\-net=bridge_interface
--- a/src/zsh_completion/_firejail.in
+++ b/src/zsh_completion/_firejail.in
@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ _firejail_args=(
    '--keep-dev-shm[/dev/shm directory is untouched (even with --private-dev)]'
    '--keep-fd[inherit open file descriptors to sandbox]: :'
    '--keep-var-tmp[/var/tmp directory is untouched]'
+    '--landlock-read=-[Landlock read access rule]: :_files'
+    '--landlock-write=-[Landlock write access rule]: :_files'
+    '--landlock-restricted-write=-[Landlock write access rule that doesn't include creation of FIFO pipes, sockets and block devices]: :_files'
+    '--landlock-execute=-[Landlock execution-permitting rule]: :_files'
    '--machine-id[spoof /etc/machine-id with a random id]'
    '--memory-deny-write-execute[seccomp filter to block attempts to create memory mappings that are both writable and executable]'
    '*--mkdir=-[create a directory]:'